High-Probability Nash Regret for Decentralized Learning in Markov $α$-Potential Games: Episodic and Fully Online Asynchronous Algorithms with Applications to Markov Congestion Games

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2609.14959v1
• Date: Mon, 14 Sep 2026 03:06:51 GMT
• Title: High-Probability Nash Regret for Decentralized Learning in Markov $α$-Potential Games: Episodic and Fully Online Asynchronous Algorithms with Applications to Markov Congestion Games
• Abstract summary: We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in Markov $$-potential games under bandit feedback.<n>We develop KL-projected natural policy gradient (NPG) algorithms in two settings: an episodic setting with frozen policies during sampling and a fully online setting in which players receive a single realized cost sample per time step.
• Score: 2.6397379133308214
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: We study decentralized learning of Nash equilibria (NE) in infinite-horizon discounted Markov games under bandit feedback, focusing on Markov $α$-potential games. We develop KL-projected natural policy gradient (NPG) algorithms in two settings: an episodic setting with frozen policies during sampling and a fully online setting in which players receive a single realized cost sample per time step and update their policies asynchronously along a continuing trajectory. We establish finite-time high-probability NE regret bounds of order $\widetilde O(T^{-1/4})$ and $\widetilde O(T^{-2/15})$ for the episodic and fully online settings, respectively, up to fixed approximation terms. Crucially, our bounds eliminate the distribution-mismatch coefficient, which can scale prohibitively with the size of the state space, while accommodating potential approximation, estimation-oracle bias, and transition sensitivity. We further identify a state-wise potential structure that yields sharper guarantees with additive dependence on the potential approximation error $α$. We specialize the framework to independent-resource Markov congestion games (IMCGs), establish their approximate-potential and transition-sensitivity properties, and construct decentralized estimation oracles from realized costs. As an application, we introduce strategic online job scheduling on stochastic machines and obtain a scalable decentralized algorithm for learning stable dispatching policies. Overall, our results provide the first finite-time high-probability NE regret guarantees for fully online asynchronous decentralized learning in Markov $α$-potential games, remove distribution-mismatch coefficients from the regret bounds, accommodate fixed estimation-oracle bias, and provide scalable decentralized learning with finite-time guarantees for IMCGs.

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