Defending against Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Networks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2002.12162v2
• Date: Mon, 21 Jun 2021 16:13:32 GMT
• Title: Defending against Backdoor Attack on Deep Neural Networks
• Authors: Kaidi Xu, Sijia Liu, Pin-Yu Chen, Pu Zhao, Xue Lin
• Abstract summary: We study the so-called textitbackdoor attack, which injects a backdoor trigger to a small portion of training data. Experiments show that our method could effectively decrease the attack success rate, and also hold a high classification accuracy for clean images.
• Score: 98.45955746226106
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Although deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved a great success in various computer vision tasks, it is recently found that they are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, we focus on the so-called \textit{backdoor attack}, which injects a backdoor trigger to a small portion of training data (also known as data poisoning) such that the trained DNN induces misclassification while facing examples with this trigger. To be specific, we carefully study the effect of both real and synthetic backdoor attacks on the internal response of vanilla and backdoored DNNs through the lens of Gard-CAM. Moreover, we show that the backdoor attack induces a significant bias in neuron activation in terms of the $\ell_\infty$ norm of an activation map compared to its $\ell_1$ and $\ell_2$ norm. Spurred by our results, we propose the \textit{$\ell_\infty$-based neuron pruning} to remove the backdoor from the backdoored DNN. Experiments show that our method could effectively decrease the attack success rate, and also hold a high classification accuracy for clean images.

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