Poison Attacks against Text Datasets with Conditional Adversarially Regularized Autoencoder

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2010.02684v1
• Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2020 13:03:49 GMT
• Title: Poison Attacks against Text Datasets with Conditional Adversarially Regularized Autoencoder
• Authors: Alvin Chan, Yi Tay, Yew-Soon Ong, Aston Zhang
• Abstract summary: This paper demonstrates a fatal vulnerability in natural language inference (NLI) and text classification systems. We present a 'backdoor poisoning' attack on NLP models.
• Score: 78.01180944665089
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: This paper demonstrates a fatal vulnerability in natural language inference (NLI) and text classification systems. More concretely, we present a 'backdoor poisoning' attack on NLP models. Our poisoning attack utilizes conditional adversarially regularized autoencoder (CARA) to generate poisoned training samples by poison injection in latent space. Just by adding 1% poisoned data, our experiments show that a victim BERT finetuned classifier's predictions can be steered to the poison target class with success rates of >80% when the input hypothesis is injected with the poison signature, demonstrating that NLI and text classification systems face a huge security risk.

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