An algorithm for a fairer and better voting system
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2110.07066v1
- Date: Wed, 13 Oct 2021 22:34:49 GMT
- Title: An algorithm for a fairer and better voting system
- Authors: Gabriel-Claudiu Grama
- Abstract summary: This article is about a novel, better ranked voting system that aims to solve the problem of finding the best candidate to represent the voters.
We have the source code on GitHub, for making realistic simulations of elections, based on artificial intelligence.
We have convincing evidence that our algorithm is better than Instant-Runoff Voting, Preferential Block Voting, Single Transferable Vote, and First Past The Post.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
- Abstract: The major finding, of this article, is an ensemble method, but more exactly,
a novel, better ranked voting system (and other variations of it), that aims to
solve the problem of finding the best candidate to represent the voters. We
have the source code on GitHub, for making realistic simulations of elections,
based on artificial intelligence for comparing different variations of the
algorithm, and other already known algorithms.
We have convincing evidence that our algorithm is better than Instant-Runoff
Voting, Preferential Block Voting, Single Transferable Vote, and First Past The
Post (if certain, natural conditions are met, to support the wisdom of the
crowds). By also comparing with the best voter, we demonstrated the wisdom of
the crowds, suggesting that democracy (distributed system) is a better option
than dictatorship (centralized system), if those certain, natural conditions
are met.
Voting systems are not restricted to politics, they are ensemble methods for
artificial intelligence, but the context of this article is natural
intelligence. It is important to find a system that is fair (e.g. freedom of
expression on the ballot exists), especially when the outcome of the voting
system has social impact: some voting systems have the unfair inevitability to
trend (over time) towards the same two major candidates (Duverger's law).
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