TESSERACT: Gradient Flip Score to Secure Federated Learning Against
Model Poisoning Attacks
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2110.10108v1
- Date: Tue, 19 Oct 2021 17:03:29 GMT
- Title: TESSERACT: Gradient Flip Score to Secure Federated Learning Against
Model Poisoning Attacks
- Authors: Atul Sharma, Wei Chen, Joshua Zhao, Qiang Qiu, Somali Chaterji,
Saurabh Bagchi
- Abstract summary: Federated learning is vulnerable to model poisoning attacks.
This is because malicious clients can collude to make the global model inaccurate.
We develop TESSERACT, a defense against this directed deviation attack.
- Score: 25.549815759093068
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Federated learning---multi-party, distributed learning in a decentralized
environment---is vulnerable to model poisoning attacks, even more so than
centralized learning approaches. This is because malicious clients can collude
and send in carefully tailored model updates to make the global model
inaccurate. This motivated the development of Byzantine-resilient federated
learning algorithms, such as Krum, Bulyan, FABA, and FoolsGold. However, a
recently developed untargeted model poisoning attack showed that all prior
defenses can be bypassed. The attack uses the intuition that simply by changing
the sign of the gradient updates that the optimizer is computing, for a set of
malicious clients, a model can be diverted from the optima to increase the test
error rate. In this work, we develop TESSERACT---a defense against this
directed deviation attack, a state-of-the-art model poisoning attack. TESSERACT
is based on a simple intuition that in a federated learning setting, certain
patterns of gradient flips are indicative of an attack. This intuition is
remarkably stable across different learning algorithms, models, and datasets.
TESSERACT assigns reputation scores to the participating clients based on their
behavior during the training phase and then takes a weighted contribution of
the clients. We show that TESSERACT provides robustness against even a
white-box version of the attack.
Related papers
- FreqFed: A Frequency Analysis-Based Approach for Mitigating Poisoning
Attacks in Federated Learning [98.43475653490219]
Federated learning (FL) is susceptible to poisoning attacks.
FreqFed is a novel aggregation mechanism that transforms the model updates into the frequency domain.
We demonstrate that FreqFed can mitigate poisoning attacks effectively with a negligible impact on the utility of the aggregated model.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-12-07T16:56:24Z) - Data-Agnostic Model Poisoning against Federated Learning: A Graph
Autoencoder Approach [65.2993866461477]
This paper proposes a data-agnostic, model poisoning attack on Federated Learning (FL)
The attack requires no knowledge of FL training data and achieves both effectiveness and undetectability.
Experiments show that the FL accuracy drops gradually under the proposed attack and existing defense mechanisms fail to detect it.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-11-30T12:19:10Z) - Towards Attack-tolerant Federated Learning via Critical Parameter
Analysis [85.41873993551332]
Federated learning systems are susceptible to poisoning attacks when malicious clients send false updates to the central server.
This paper proposes a new defense strategy, FedCPA (Federated learning with Critical Analysis)
Our attack-tolerant aggregation method is based on the observation that benign local models have similar sets of top-k and bottom-k critical parameters, whereas poisoned local models do not.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-08-18T05:37:55Z) - Isolation and Induction: Training Robust Deep Neural Networks against
Model Stealing Attacks [51.51023951695014]
Existing model stealing defenses add deceptive perturbations to the victim's posterior probabilities to mislead the attackers.
This paper proposes Isolation and Induction (InI), a novel and effective training framework for model stealing defenses.
In contrast to adding perturbations over model predictions that harm the benign accuracy, we train models to produce uninformative outputs against stealing queries.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-08-02T05:54:01Z) - FedDefender: Client-Side Attack-Tolerant Federated Learning [60.576073964874]
Federated learning enables learning from decentralized data sources without compromising privacy.
It is vulnerable to model poisoning attacks, where malicious clients interfere with the training process.
We propose a new defense mechanism that focuses on the client-side, called FedDefender, to help benign clients train robust local models.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2023-07-18T08:00:41Z) - Defending against the Label-flipping Attack in Federated Learning [5.769445676575767]
Federated learning (FL) provides autonomy and privacy by design to participating peers.
The label-flipping (LF) attack is a targeted poisoning attack where the attackers poison their training data by flipping the labels of some examples.
We propose a novel defense that first dynamically extracts those gradients from the peers' local updates.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-07-05T12:02:54Z) - FL-Defender: Combating Targeted Attacks in Federated Learning [7.152674461313707]
Federated learning (FL) enables learning a global machine learning model from local data distributed among a set of participating workers.
FL is vulnerable to targeted poisoning attacks that negatively impact the integrity of the learned model.
We propose textitFL-Defender as a method to combat FL targeted attacks.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-07-02T16:04:46Z) - MPAF: Model Poisoning Attacks to Federated Learning based on Fake
Clients [51.973224448076614]
We propose the first Model Poisoning Attack based on Fake clients called MPAF.
MPAF can significantly decrease the test accuracy of the global model, even if classical defenses and norm clipping are adopted.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2022-03-16T14:59:40Z) - SparseFed: Mitigating Model Poisoning Attacks in Federated Learning with
Sparsification [24.053704318868043]
In model poisoning attacks, the attacker reduces the model's performance on targeted sub-tasks by uploading "poisoned" updates.
We introduce algoname, a novel defense that uses global top-k update sparsification and device-level clipping gradient to mitigate model poisoning attacks.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2021-12-12T16:34:52Z) - Mitigating the Impact of Adversarial Attacks in Very Deep Networks [10.555822166916705]
Deep Neural Network (DNN) models have vulnerabilities related to security concerns.
Data poisoning-enabled perturbation attacks are complex adversarial ones that inject false data into models.
We propose an attack-agnostic-based defense method for mitigating their influence.
arXiv Detail & Related papers (2020-12-08T21:25:44Z)
This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.
This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.