Invitation in Crowdsourcing Contests
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2112.02884v1
- Date: Mon, 6 Dec 2021 09:18:18 GMT
- Title: Invitation in Crowdsourcing Contests
- Authors: Qi Shi, Dong Hao
- Abstract summary: In this work, we take peoples' social ties as a key factor in the modeling and designing of agents' incentives for crowdsourcing contests.
We establish a new contest mechanism by which the requester can impel agents to invite their neighbours to contribute to the task.
According to our equilibrium analysis, in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium agents' behaviors show a vast diversity, capturing that besides the intrinsic ability, the social ties among agents also play a central role for decision-making.
- Score: 9.860944032009847
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: In a crowdsourcing contest, a requester holding a task posts it to a crowd.
People in the crowd then compete with each other to win the rewards. Although
in real life, a crowd is usually networked and people influence each other via
social ties, existing crowdsourcing contest theories do not aim to answer how
interpersonal relationships influence peoples' incentives and behaviors, and
thereby affect the crowdsourcing performance. In this work, we novelly take
peoples' social ties as a key factor in the modeling and designing of agents'
incentives for crowdsourcing contests. We then establish a new contest
mechanism by which the requester can impel agents to invite their neighbours to
contribute to the task. The mechanism has a simple rule and is very easy for
agents to play. According to our equilibrium analysis, in the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium agents' behaviors show a vast diversity, capturing that besides the
intrinsic ability, the social ties among agents also play a central role for
decision-making. After that, we design an effective algorithm to automatically
compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the invitation crowdsourcing contest
and further adapt it to large graphs. Both theoretical and empirical results
show that, the invitation crowdsourcing contest can substantially enlarge the
number of contributors, whereby the requester can obtain significantly better
solutions without a large advertisement expenditure.
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