Planting Undetectable Backdoors in Machine Learning Models

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2204.06974v2
• Date: Sat, 09 Nov 2024 18:58:35 GMT
• Title: Planting Undetectable Backdoors in Machine Learning Models
• Authors: Shafi Goldwasser, Michael P. Kim, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, Or Zamir,
• Abstract summary: We show how a malicious learner can plant an undetectable backdoor into a classifier. Without the appropriate "backdoor key", the mechanism is hidden and cannot be detected by any computationally-bounded observer. We show two frameworks for planting undetectable backdoors, with incomparable guarantees.
• Score: 14.592078676445201
• License:
• Abstract: Given the computational cost and technical expertise required to train machine learning models, users may delegate the task of learning to a service provider. We show how a malicious learner can plant an undetectable backdoor into a classifier. On the surface, such a backdoored classifier behaves normally, but in reality, the learner maintains a mechanism for changing the classification of any input, with only a slight perturbation. Importantly, without the appropriate "backdoor key", the mechanism is hidden and cannot be detected by any computationally-bounded observer. We demonstrate two frameworks for planting undetectable backdoors, with incomparable guarantees. First, we show how to plant a backdoor in any model, using digital signature schemes. The construction guarantees that given black-box access to the original model and the backdoored version, it is computationally infeasible to find even a single input where they differ. This property implies that the backdoored model has generalization error comparable with the original model. Second, we demonstrate how to insert undetectable backdoors in models trained using the Random Fourier Features (RFF) learning paradigm or in Random ReLU networks. In this construction, undetectability holds against powerful white-box distinguishers: given a complete description of the network and the training data, no efficient distinguisher can guess whether the model is "clean" or contains a backdoor. Our construction of undetectable backdoors also sheds light on the related issue of robustness to adversarial examples. In particular, our construction can produce a classifier that is indistinguishable from an "adversarially robust" classifier, but where every input has an adversarial example! In summary, the existence of undetectable backdoors represent a significant theoretical roadblock to certifying adversarial robustness.

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