Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning by Rare Embeddings and Gradient
Ensembling
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2204.14017v1
- Date: Fri, 29 Apr 2022 11:17:05 GMT
- Title: Backdoor Attacks in Federated Learning by Rare Embeddings and Gradient
Ensembling
- Authors: KiYoon Yoo, Nojun Kwak
- Abstract summary: This paper investigates the feasibility of model poisoning for backdoor attacks through textitrare word embeddings of NLP models in text classification and sequence-to-sequence tasks.
For a less complex dataset, a mere 0.1% of adversary clients is enough to poison the global model effectively.
We also propose a technique specialized in the federated learning scheme called gradient ensemble, which enhances the backdoor performance in all experimental settings.
- Score: 36.30908735595904
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Recent advances in federated learning have demonstrated its promising
capability to learn on decentralized datasets. However, a considerable amount
of work has raised concerns due to the potential risks of adversaries
participating in the framework to poison the global model for an adversarial
purpose. This paper investigates the feasibility of model poisoning for
backdoor attacks through \textit{rare word embeddings of NLP models} in text
classification and sequence-to-sequence tasks. In text classification, less
than 1\% of adversary clients suffices to manipulate the model output without
any drop in the performance of clean sentences. For a less complex dataset, a
mere 0.1\% of adversary clients is enough to poison the global model
effectively. We also propose a technique specialized in the federated learning
scheme called gradient ensemble, which enhances the backdoor performance in all
experimental settings.
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