Principal Trade-off Analysis

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2206.07520v3
• Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2023 22:01:32 GMT
• Title: Principal Trade-off Analysis
• Authors: Alexander Strang, David SeWell, Alexander Kim, Kevin Alcedo, David Rosenbluth
• Abstract summary: We show "Principal Trade-off Analysis" (PTA), a decomposition method that embeds games into a low-dimensional feature space. PTA represents an arbitrary two-player zero-sum game as the weighted sum of pairs of 2D feature planes. We demonstrate the validity of PTA on a quartet of games (Kuhn poker, RPS+2, Blotto, and Pokemon)
• Score: 79.16635054977068
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: How are the advantage relations between a set of agents playing a game organized and how do they reflect the structure of the game? In this paper, we illustrate "Principal Trade-off Analysis" (PTA), a decomposition method that embeds games into a low-dimensional feature space. We argue that the embeddings are more revealing than previously demonstrated by developing an analogy to Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PTA represents an arbitrary two-player zero-sum game as the weighted sum of pairs of orthogonal 2D feature planes. We show that the feature planes represent unique strategic trade-offs and truncation of the sequence provides insightful model reduction. We demonstrate the validity of PTA on a quartet of games (Kuhn poker, RPS+2, Blotto, and Pokemon). In Kuhn poker, PTA clearly identifies the trade-off between bluffing and calling. In Blotto, PTA identifies game symmetries, and specifies strategic trade-offs associated with distinct win conditions. These symmetries reveal limitations of PTA unaddressed in previous work. For Pokemon, PTA recovers clusters that naturally correspond to Pokemon types, correctly identifies the designed trade-off between those types, and discovers a rock-paper-scissor (RPS) cycle in the Pokemon generation type - all absent any specific information except game outcomes.

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