Multiple Perturbation Attack: Attack Pixelwise Under Different $\ell_p$-norms For Better Adversarial Performance

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2212.03069v2
• Date: Wed, 7 Dec 2022 18:30:33 GMT
• Title: Multiple Perturbation Attack: Attack Pixelwise Under Different $\ell_p$-norms For Better Adversarial Performance
• Authors: Ngoc N. Tran, Anh Tuan Bui, Dinh Phung, Trung Le
• Abstract summary: Adversarial attacks and defenses are usually likened to a cat-and-mouse game in which defenders and attackers evolve over the time. We come up with a natural approach: combining various $ell_p$ gradient projections on a pixel level to achieve a joint adversarial perturbation. Specifically, we learn how to perturb each pixel to maximize the attack performance, while maintaining the overall visual imperceptibility of adversarial examples.
• Score: 17.57296795184232
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Adversarial machine learning has been both a major concern and a hot topic recently, especially with the ubiquitous use of deep neural networks in the current landscape. Adversarial attacks and defenses are usually likened to a cat-and-mouse game in which defenders and attackers evolve over the time. On one hand, the goal is to develop strong and robust deep networks that are resistant to malicious actors. On the other hand, in order to achieve that, we need to devise even stronger adversarial attacks to challenge these defense models. Most of existing attacks employs a single $\ell_p$ distance (commonly, $p\in\{1,2,\infty\}$) to define the concept of closeness and performs steepest gradient ascent w.r.t. this $p$-norm to update all pixels in an adversarial example in the same way. These $\ell_p$ attacks each has its own pros and cons; and there is no single attack that can successfully break through defense models that are robust against multiple $\ell_p$ norms simultaneously. Motivated by these observations, we come up with a natural approach: combining various $\ell_p$ gradient projections on a pixel level to achieve a joint adversarial perturbation. Specifically, we learn how to perturb each pixel to maximize the attack performance, while maintaining the overall visual imperceptibility of adversarial examples. Finally, through various experiments with standardized benchmarks, we show that our method outperforms most current strong attacks across state-of-the-art defense mechanisms, while retaining its ability to remain clean visually.

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