Commitment with Signaling under Double-sided Information Asymmetry
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2212.11446v3
- Date: Sat, 26 Aug 2023 16:46:51 GMT
- Title: Commitment with Signaling under Double-sided Information Asymmetry
- Authors: Tao Li and Quanyan Zhu
- Abstract summary: This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian Stackelberg game.
We show that by adequately designing a signaling device that reveals partial information regarding the leader's realized action to the follower, the leader can achieve a higher expected utility than that without signaling.
- Score: 19.349072233281852
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage
to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other
players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian
Stackelberg game, where the leader's realized action, sampled from the mixed
strategy commitment, is hidden from the follower. In contrast, the follower
holds private information about his payoff. Given asymmetric information on
both sides, an important question arises: \emph{Does the leader's information
advantage outweigh the follower's?} We answer this question affirmatively in
this work, where we demonstrate that by adequately designing a signaling device
that reveals partial information regarding the leader's realized action to the
follower, the leader can achieve a higher expected utility than that without
signaling. Moreover, unlike previous works on the Bayesian Stackelberg game
where mathematical programming tools are utilized, we interpret the leader's
commitment as a probability measure over the belief space. Such a probabilistic
language greatly simplifies the analysis and allows an indirect signaling
scheme, leading to a geometric characterization of the equilibrium under the
proposed game model.
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