A Characterization of Perfect Strategies for Mirror Games
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.04557v3
- Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 07:45:26 GMT
- Title: A Characterization of Perfect Strategies for Mirror Games
- Authors: Sizhuo Yan, Jianting Yang, Tianshi Yu, Lihong Zhi
- Abstract summary: We associate mirror games with the universal game algebra and use the *-representation to describe quantum commuting operator strategies.
An algorithm based on noncommutative Gr"obner basis computation and semidefinite programming is given for certifying that a given mirror game has no perfect commuting operator strategies.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: We associate mirror games with the universal game algebra and use the
*-representation to describe quantum commuting operator strategies. We provide
an algebraic characterization of whether or not a mirror game has perfect
commuting operator strategies. This new characterization uses a smaller algebra
introduced by Paulsen and others for synchronous games and the noncommutative
Nullstellensatz developed by Cimpric, Helton and collaborators. An algorithm
based on noncommutative Gr\"obner basis computation and semidefinite
programming is given for certifying that a given mirror game has no perfect
commuting operator strategies.
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