The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.09478v2
• Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2024 10:28:38 GMT
• Title: The Role of Transparency in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Unknown Valuations
• Authors: Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi, Tommaso Cesari, Roberto Colomboni, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi,
• Abstract summary: We study the problem of regret for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, of the minimax regret in terms of the auction's emphtransparency These minimax rates reveal how the interplay between transparency and the nature of the environment affects how fast one can learn to bid optimally in first-price auctions.
• Score: 21.491106045668054
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: We study the problem of regret minimization for a single bidder in a sequence of first-price auctions where the bidder discovers the item's value only if the auction is won. Our main contribution is a complete characterization, up to logarithmic factors, of the minimax regret in terms of the auction's \emph{transparency}, which controls the amount of information on competing bids disclosed by the auctioneer at the end of each auction. Our results hold under different assumptions (stochastic, adversarial, and their smoothed variants) on the environment generating the bidder's valuations and competing bids. These minimax rates reveal how the interplay between transparency and the nature of the environment affects how fast one can learn to bid optimally in first-price auctions.

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