Joint Value Estimation and Bidding in Repeated First-Price Auctions

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2502.17292v1
• Date: Mon, 24 Feb 2025 16:21:50 GMT
• Title: Joint Value Estimation and Bidding in Repeated First-Price Auctions
• Authors: Yuxiao Wen, Yanjun Han, Zhengyuan Zhou,
• Abstract summary: We study regret in repeated first-price auctions, where a bidder observes only the realized outcome after each auction -- win or loss.<n>We propose algorithms that jointly estimate private values and optimize bidding strategies, achieving near-optimal regret bounds.
• Score: 28.10186884181921
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: We study regret minimization in repeated first-price auctions (FPAs), where a bidder observes only the realized outcome after each auction -- win or loss. This setup reflects practical scenarios in online display advertising where the actual value of an impression depends on the difference between two potential outcomes, such as clicks or conversion rates, when the auction is won versus lost. We analyze three outcome models: (1) adversarial outcomes without features, (2) linear potential outcomes with features, and (3) linear treatment effects in features. For each setting, we propose algorithms that jointly estimate private values and optimize bidding strategies, achieving near-optimal regret bounds. Notably, our framework enjoys a unique feature that the treatments are also actively chosen, and hence eliminates the need for the overlap condition commonly required in causal inference.

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