Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2307.11565v2
- Date: Fri, 23 Feb 2024 12:42:24 GMT
- Title: Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor
- Authors: Dong Huang, Qingwen Bu
- Abstract summary: We propose Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor (FMP) to mitigate backdoor attacks.
FMP attempts to prune backdoor feature maps, which are trained to extract backdoor information from inputs.
Our experiments demonstrate that, compared to existing defense strategies, FMP can effectively reduce the Attack Success Rate (ASR) even against the most complex and invisible attack triggers.
- Score: 4.550555443103878
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Deep neural networks have been widely used in many critical applications,
such as autonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis. However, their security is
threatened by backdoor attacks, which are achieved by adding artificial
patterns to specific training data. Existing defense strategies primarily focus
on using reverse engineering to reproduce the backdoor trigger generated by
attackers and subsequently repair the DNN model by adding the trigger into
inputs and fine-tuning the model with ground-truth labels. However, once the
trigger generated by the attackers is complex and invisible, the defender
cannot reproduce the trigger successfully then the DNN model will not be
repaired, as the trigger is not effectively removed.
In this work, we propose Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor (FMP)
to mitigate backdoor from the DNN. Unlike existing defense strategies, which
focus on reproducing backdoor triggers, FMP attempts to prune backdoor feature
maps, which are trained to extract backdoor information from inputs. After
pruning these backdoor feature maps, FMP will fine-tune the model with a secure
subset of training data. Our experiments demonstrate that, compared to existing
defense strategies, FMP can effectively reduce the Attack Success Rate (ASR)
even against the most complex and invisible attack triggers (e.g., FMP
decreases the ASR to 2.86\% in CIFAR10, which is 19.2\% to 65.41\% lower than
baselines). Second, unlike conventional defense methods that tend to exhibit
low robust accuracy (that is, the accuracy of the model on poisoned data), FMP
achieves a higher RA, indicating its superiority in maintaining model
performance while mitigating the effects of backdoor attacks (e.g., FMP obtains
87.40\% RA in CIFAR10). Our code is publicly available at:
https://github.com/retsuh-bqw/FMP.
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