A Survey on Acoustic Side Channel Attacks on Keyboards

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2309.11012v2
• Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2023 17:23:50 GMT
• Title: A Survey on Acoustic Side Channel Attacks on Keyboards
• Authors: Alireza Taheritajar, Zahra Mahmoudpour Harris, Reza Rahaeimehr,
• Abstract summary: Mechanical keyboards are susceptible to acoustic side-channel attacks. Researchers have developed methods that can extract typed keystrokes from ambient noise. With the improvement of microphone technology, the potential vulnerability to acoustic side-channel attacks also increases.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Most electronic devices utilize mechanical keyboards to receive inputs, including sensitive information such as authentication credentials, personal and private data, emails, plans, etc. However, these systems are susceptible to acoustic side-channel attacks. Researchers have successfully developed methods that can extract typed keystrokes from ambient noise. As the prevalence of keyboard-based input systems continues to expand across various computing platforms, and with the improvement of microphone technology, the potential vulnerability to acoustic side-channel attacks also increases. This survey paper thoroughly reviews existing research, explaining why such attacks are feasible, the applicable threat models, and the methodologies employed to launch and enhance these attacks.

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