Random and Safe Cache Architecture to Defeat Cache Timing Attacks

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2309.16172v2
• Date: Mon, 22 Apr 2024 02:15:38 GMT
• Title: Random and Safe Cache Architecture to Defeat Cache Timing Attacks
• Authors: Guangyuan Hu, Ruby B. Lee,
• Abstract summary: Caches have been exploited to leak secret information due to the different times they take to handle memory accesses. We present a systematic view of the attack and defense space and show that no existing defense has addressed all cache timing attacks. We propose Random and Safe (RaS) cache architectures to decorrelate cache state changes from memory requests.
• Score: 5.142233612851766
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Caches have been exploited to leak secret information due to the different times they take to handle memory accesses. Cache timing attacks include non-speculative cache side and covert channel attacks and cache-based speculative execution attacks. We first present a systematic view of the attack and defense space and show that no existing defense has addressed all cache timing attacks, which we do in this paper. We propose Random and Safe (RaS) cache architectures to decorrelate cache state changes from memory requests. RaS fills the cache with ``safe'' cache lines that are likely to be used in the future, rather than with demand-fetched, security-sensitive lines. RaS lifts the restriction on cache fills for accesses that become safe when speculative execution is resolved and authorized. Our RaS-Spec design against cache-based speculative execution attacks has a low 3.8% average performance overhead. RaS+ variants against both speculative and non-speculative attacks have security-performance trade-offs ranging from 7.9% to 45.2% average overhead.

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