Quantum forgery attacks against OTR structures based on Simon's
algorithm
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2310.02924v1
- Date: Sun, 1 Oct 2023 15:16:43 GMT
- Title: Quantum forgery attacks against OTR structures based on Simon's
algorithm
- Authors: Wenjie Liu, Mengting Wang, Zixian Li
- Abstract summary: A quantum forgery attack on OTR structure using Simon's algorithm is proposed.
A variant of OTR structure (Pr/ost-OTR-Even-Mansour structure) is proposed.
It is easy to generate the correct tag of any given message if attacker is allowed to change a single block in it.
- Score: 3.845166861382186
- License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
- Abstract: Classical forgery attacks against Offset Two-round (OTR) structures require
some harsh conditions, such as some plaintext and ciphertext pairs need to be
known, and the success probability is not too high. To solve these problems, a
quantum forgery attack on OTR structure using Simon's algorithm is proposed.
The attacker intercept the ciphertext-tag pair $(C,T)$ between the sender and
receiver, while Simon's algorithm is used to find the period of the tag
generation function in OTR, then we can successfully forge new ciphertext $C'$
($C'\ne C$) for intercepted tag $T$. For a variant of OTR structure
(Pr{/o}st-OTR-Even-Mansour structure), a universal forgery attack, in which it
is easy to generate the correct tag of any given message if the attacker is
allowed to change a single block in it, is proposed. It first obtains the
secret parameter L using Simon's algorithm, then the secret parameter L is used
to find the keys $k_1$ and $k_2$, so that an attacker can forge the changed
messages. It only needs several plaintext blocks to help obtain the keys to
forge any messages. Performance analysis shows that the query complexity of our
attack is $O(n)$, and its success probability is very close to 1.
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