A Last-Level Defense for Application Integrity and Confidentiality

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.06154v1
• Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 16:15:44 GMT
• Title: A Last-Level Defense for Application Integrity and Confidentiality
• Authors: Gabriel P. Fernandez, Andrey Brito, Ardhi Putra Pratama Hartono, Muhammad Usama Sardar, Christof Fetzer,
• Abstract summary: We introduce a novel system, LLD, that enforces the integrity and consistency of applications in a transparent and scalable fashion. Our solution mitigates TEEs with instantiation control and rollback protection. Our rollback detection mechanism does not need excessive replication, nor does it sacrifice durability.
• Score: 0.610240618821149
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Our objective is to protect the integrity and confidentiality of applications operating in untrusted environments. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are not a panacea. Hardware TEEs fail to protect applications against Sybil, Fork and Rollback Attacks and, consequently, fail to preserve the consistency and integrity of applications. We introduce a novel system, LLD, that enforces the integrity and consistency of applications in a transparent and scalable fashion. Our solution augments TEEs with instantiation control and rollback protection. Instantiation control, enforced with TEE-supported leases, mitigates Sybil/Fork Attacks without incurring the high costs of solving crypto-puzzles. Our rollback detection mechanism does not need excessive replication, nor does it sacrifice durability. We show that implementing these functionalities in the LLD runtime automatically protects applications and services such as a popular DBMS.

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