Jailbreaking GPT-4V via Self-Adversarial Attacks with System Prompts
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.09127v2
- Date: Sat, 20 Jan 2024 18:55:51 GMT
- Title: Jailbreaking GPT-4V via Self-Adversarial Attacks with System Prompts
- Authors: Yuanwei Wu, Xiang Li, Yixin Liu, Pan Zhou and Lichao Sun
- Abstract summary: We discover a system prompt leakage vulnerability in GPT-4V.
By employing GPT-4 as a red teaming tool against itself, we aim to search for potential jailbreak prompts leveraging stolen system prompts.
We also evaluate the effect of modifying system prompts to defend against jailbreaking attacks.
- Score: 64.60375604495883
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: Existing work on jailbreak Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has
focused primarily on adversarial examples in model inputs, with less attention
to vulnerabilities, especially in model API. To fill the research gap, we carry
out the following work: 1) We discover a system prompt leakage vulnerability in
GPT-4V. Through carefully designed dialogue, we successfully extract the
internal system prompts of GPT-4V. This finding indicates potential exploitable
security risks in MLLMs; 2) Based on the acquired system prompts, we propose a
novel MLLM jailbreaking attack method termed SASP (Self-Adversarial Attack via
System Prompt). By employing GPT-4 as a red teaming tool against itself, we aim
to search for potential jailbreak prompts leveraging stolen system prompts.
Furthermore, in pursuit of better performance, we also add human modification
based on GPT-4's analysis, which further improves the attack success rate to
98.7\%; 3) We evaluated the effect of modifying system prompts to defend
against jailbreaking attacks. Results show that appropriately designed system
prompts can significantly reduce jailbreak success rates. Overall, our work
provides new insights into enhancing MLLM security, demonstrating the important
role of system prompts in jailbreaking. This finding could be leveraged to
greatly facilitate jailbreak success rates while also holding the potential for
defending against jailbreaks.
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