The CURE To Vulnerabilities in RPKI Validation

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.01872v1
• Date: Mon, 4 Dec 2023 13:09:37 GMT
• Title: The CURE To Vulnerabilities in RPKI Validation
• Authors: Donika Mirdita, Haya Schulmann, Niklas Vogel, Michael Waidner,
• Abstract summary: RPKI has seen increasing adoption, with now 37.8% of the major networks filtering bogus BGP routes. We report a total of 18 vulnerabilities that can be exploited to downgrade RPKI validation in border routers. We generate over 600 million test cases and tested all popular RPs on them.
• Score: 19.36803276657266
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Over recent years, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) has seen increasing adoption, with now 37.8% of the major networks filtering bogus BGP routes. Systems interact with the RPKI over Relying Party (RP) implementations that fetch RPKI objects and feed BGP routers with the validated prefix-ownership data. Consequently, any vulnerabilities or flaws within the RP software can substantially threaten the stability and security of Internet routing. We uncover severe flaws in all popular RP implementations, making them susceptible to path traversal attacks, remotely triggered crashes, and inherent inconsistencies, violating RPKI standards. We report a total of 18 vulnerabilities that canbe exploited to downgrade RPKI validation in border routers or, worse, enable poisoning of the validation process, resulting in malicious prefixes being wrongfully validated and legitimate RPKI-covered prefixes failing validation. Furthermore, our research discloses inconsistencies in the validation process, with two popular implementations leaving 8149 prefixes unprotected from hijacks, 6405 of which belong to Amazon. While these findings are significant in their own right, our principal contribution lies in developing CURE, the first-of-its-kind system to systematically detect bugs, vulnerabilities, and RFC compliance issues in RP implementations via automated test generation. CURE is a powerful RPKI publication point emulator that enables easy and efficient fuzzing of complex RP validation pipelines. It is designed with a set of novel techniques, utilizing differential and stateful fuzzing. We generated over 600 million test cases and tested all popular RPs on them. Following our disclosure, the vendors already assigned CVEs to the vulnerabilities we found.

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