SSL-OTA: Unveiling Backdoor Threats in Self-Supervised Learning for Object Detection

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.00137v2
• Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2024 06:38:13 GMT
• Title: SSL-OTA: Unveiling Backdoor Threats in Self-Supervised Learning for Object Detection
• Authors: Qiannan Wang, Changchun Yin, Lu Zhou, Liming Fang,
• Abstract summary: We propose the first backdoor attack designed for object detection tasks in SSL scenarios, called Object Transform Attack (SSL-OTA) SSL-OTA employs a trigger capable of altering predictions of the target object to the desired category. We conduct extensive experiments on benchmark datasets, demonstrating the effectiveness of our proposed attack and its resistance to potential defenses.
• Score: 8.178238811631093
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: The extensive adoption of Self-supervised learning(SSL) has led to an increased security threat from backdoor attacks. While existing research has mainly focused on backdoor attacks in image classification, there has been limited exploration of their implications for object detection. Object detection plays a critical role in security-sensitive applications, such as autonomous driving, where backdoor attacks seriously threaten human life and property. In this work, we propose the first backdoor attack designed for object detection tasks in SSL scenarios, called Object Transform Attack (SSL-OTA). SSL-OTA employs a trigger capable of altering predictions of the target object to the desired category, encompassing two attacks: Naive Attack(NA) and Dual-Source Blending Attack (DSBA). NA conducts data poisoning during downstream fine-tuning of the object detector, while DSBA additionally injects backdoors into the pre-trained encoder. We establish appropriate metrics and conduct extensive experiments on benchmark datasets, demonstrating the effectiveness of our proposed attack and its resistance to potential defenses. Notably, both NA and DSBA achieve high attack success rates (ASR) at extremely low poisoning rates (0.5%). The results underscore the importance of considering backdoor threats in SSL-based object detection and contribute a novel perspective to the field.

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