Incentivizing Secure Software Development: The Role of Liability (Waiver) and Audit

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2401.08476v1
• Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2024 16:27:30 GMT
• Title: Incentivizing Secure Software Development: The Role of Liability (Waiver) and Audit
• Authors: Ziyuan Huang, Gergely Biczók, Mingyan Liu,
• Abstract summary: Recently proposed U.S. National Cybersecurity Strategy shifts responsibility for cyber incidents back to software vendors. In doing so, the strategy also puts forward the concept of the liability waiver. We show that the optimal strategy for an opt-in vendor is to never quit; and exert cumulative investments in either "one-and-done" or "incremental" manner.
• Score: 13.971996404435172
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• Abstract: Misaligned incentives in secure software development have long been the focus of research in the economics of security. Product liability, a powerful legal framework in other industries, has been largely ineffective for software products until recent times. However, the rapid regulatory responses to recent global cyberattacks by both the United States and the European Union, together with the (relative) success of the General Data Protection Regulation in defining both duty and standard of care for software vendors, may just enable regulators to use liability to re-align incentives for the benefit of the digital society. Specifically, the recently proposed United States National Cybersecurity Strategy shifts responsibility for cyber incidents back to software vendors. In doing so, the strategy also puts forward the concept of the liability waiver: if a software company voluntarily undergoes and passes an IT security audit, its liability is waived. In this paper, we analyze this audit scenario from the aspect of the software vendor. We propose a mechanism where a software vendor should first undergo a repeated auditing process in each stage of which the vendor decides whether to quit early or stay with additional security investment. We show that the optimal strategy for an opt-in vendor is to never quit; and exert cumulative investments in either "one-and-done" or "incremental" manner. We relate the audit mechanism to a liability waiver insurance policy and revealed its effect on reshaping the vendor's risk perception. We also discuss influence of audit quality on the vendor's incentives and pinpoint that a desirable audit rule should be highly accurate and less strict.

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