Cyber Deception Reactive: TCP Stealth Redirection to On-Demand Honeypots

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.09191v2
• Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2024 11:26:52 GMT
• Title: Cyber Deception Reactive: TCP Stealth Redirection to On-Demand Honeypots
• Authors: Pedro Beltran Lopez, Pantaleone Nespoli, Manuel Gil Perez,
• Abstract summary: Cyber Deception (CYDEC) consists of deceiving the enemy who performs actions without realising that he/she is being deceived. This article proposes designing, implementing, and evaluating a deception mechanism based on the stealthy redirection of TCP communications to an on-demand honey server.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: Cybersecurity is developing rapidly, and new methods of defence against attackers are appearing, such as Cyber Deception (CYDEC). CYDEC consists of deceiving the enemy who performs actions without realising that he/she is being deceived. This article proposes designing, implementing, and evaluating a deception mechanism based on the stealthy redirection of TCP communications to an on-demand honey server with the same characteristics as the victim asset, i.e., it is a clone. Such a mechanism ensures that the defender fools the attacker, thanks to stealth redirection. In this situation, the attacker will focus on attacking the honey server while enabling the recollection of relevant information to generate threat intelligence. The experiments in different scenarios show how the proposed solution can effectively redirect an attacker to a copied asset on demand, thus protecting the real asset. Finally, the results obtained by evaluating the latency times ensure that the redirection is undetectable by humans and very difficult to detect by a machine.

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