Publicly auditable privacy-preserving electoral rolls
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11582v3
- Date: Sun, 2 Jun 2024 06:44:08 GMT
- Title: Publicly auditable privacy-preserving electoral rolls
- Authors: Prashant Agrawal, Mahabir Prasad Jhanwar, Subodh Vishnu Sharma, Subhashis Banerjee,
- Abstract summary: We study the problem of designing publicly auditable yet privacy-preserving electoral rolls.
The audit can detect polling-day ballot stuffing and denials to eligible voters by malicious polling officers.
The entire electoral roll is never revealed, which prevents any large-scale systematic voter targeting and manipulation.
- Score: 0.32498796510544625
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: While existing literature on electronic voting has extensively addressed verifiability of voting protocols, the vulnerability of electoral rolls in large public elections remains a critical concern. To ensure integrity of electoral rolls, the current practice is to either make electoral rolls public or share them with the political parties. However, this enables construction of detailed voter profiles and selective targeting and manipulation of voters, thereby undermining the fundamental principle of free and fair elections. In this paper, we study the problem of designing publicly auditable yet privacy-preserving electoral rolls. We first formulate a threat model and provide formal security definitions. We then present a protocol for creation, maintenance and usage of electoral rolls that mitigates the threats. Eligible voters can verify their inclusion, whereas political parties and auditors can statistically audit the electoral roll. Further, the audit can also detect polling-day ballot stuffing and denials to eligible voters by malicious polling officers. The entire electoral roll is never revealed, which prevents any large-scale systematic voter targeting and manipulation.
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