A First Approach to Risk-Limiting Audits for Single Transferable Vote Elections

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2112.09921v1
• Date: Sat, 18 Dec 2021 12:36:39 GMT
• Title: A First Approach to Risk-Limiting Audits for Single Transferable Vote Elections
• Authors: Michelle Blom, Peter J. Stuckey, Vanessa Teague, Damjan Vukcevic
• Abstract summary: Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are an increasingly important method for checking that the reported outcome of an election is, in fact, correct. This paper presents the first approach to risk-limiting audits for single transferable vote (STV) elections.
• Score: 27.102139020324678
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are an increasingly important method for checking that the reported outcome of an election is, in fact, correct. Indeed, their use is increasingly being legislated. While effective methods for RLAs have been developed for many forms of election -- for example: first-past-the-post, instant-runoff voting, and D'Hondt elections -- auditing methods for single transferable vote (STV) elections have yet to be developed. STV elections are notoriously hard to reason about since there is a complex interaction of votes that change their value throughout the process. In this paper we present the first approach to risk-limiting audits for STV elections, restricted to the case of 2-seat STV elections.

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