TuBA: Cross-Lingual Transferability of Backdoor Attacks in LLMs with Instruction Tuning

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.19597v2
• Date: Wed, 02 Oct 2024 15:47:40 GMT
• Title: TuBA: Cross-Lingual Transferability of Backdoor Attacks in LLMs with Instruction Tuning
• Authors: Xuanli He, Jun Wang, Qiongkai Xu, Pasquale Minervini, Pontus Stenetorp, Benjamin I. P. Rubinstein, Trevor Cohn,
• Abstract summary: Cross-lingual backdoor attacks against multilingual large language models (LLMs) are under-explored. Our research focuses on how poisoning the instruction-tuning data for one or two languages can affect the outputs for languages whose instruction-tuning data were not poisoned. Our method exhibits remarkable efficacy in models like mT5 and GPT-4o, with high attack success rates, surpassing 90% in more than 7 out of 12 languages.
• Score: 63.481446315733145
• License:
• Abstract: The implications of backdoor attacks on English-centric large language models (LLMs) have been widely examined - such attacks can be achieved by embedding malicious behaviors during training and activated under specific conditions that trigger malicious outputs. Despite the increasing support for multilingual capabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs, the impact of backdoor attacks on these systems remains largely under-explored. Our research focuses on cross-lingual backdoor attacks against multilingual LLMs, particularly investigating how poisoning the instruction-tuning data for one or two languages can affect the outputs for languages whose instruction-tuning data were not poisoned. Despite its simplicity, our empirical analysis reveals that our method exhibits remarkable efficacy in models like mT5 and GPT-4o, with high attack success rates, surpassing 90% in more than 7 out of 12 languages across various scenarios. Our findings also indicate that more powerful models show increased susceptibility to transferable cross-lingual backdoor attacks, which also applies to LLMs predominantly pre-trained on English data, such as Llama2, Llama3, and Gemma. Moreover, our experiments demonstrate 1) High Transferability: the backdoor mechanism operates successfully in cross-lingual response scenarios across 26 languages, achieving an average attack success rate of 99%, and 2) Robustness: the proposed attack remains effective even after defenses are applied. These findings expose critical security vulnerabilities in multilingual LLMs and highlight the urgent need for more robust, targeted defense strategies to address the unique challenges posed by cross-lingual backdoor transfer.

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