GI-SMN: Gradient Inversion Attack against Federated Learning without Prior Knowledge

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.03516v1
• Date: Mon, 6 May 2024 14:29:24 GMT
• Title: GI-SMN: Gradient Inversion Attack against Federated Learning without Prior Knowledge
• Authors: Jin Qian, Kaimin Wei, Yongdong Wu, Jilian Zhang, Jipeng Chen, Huan Bao,
• Abstract summary: Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a privacy-preserving machine learning approach. gradient inversion attacks can exploit the gradients of FL to recreate the original user data. We propose a novel Gradient Inversion attack based on Style Migration Network (GI-SMN)
• Score: 4.839514405631815
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Federated learning (FL) has emerged as a privacy-preserving machine learning approach where multiple parties share gradient information rather than original user data. Recent work has demonstrated that gradient inversion attacks can exploit the gradients of FL to recreate the original user data, posing significant privacy risks. However, these attacks make strong assumptions about the attacker, such as altering the model structure or parameters, gaining batch normalization statistics, or acquiring prior knowledge of the original training set, etc. Consequently, these attacks are not possible in real-world scenarios. To end it, we propose a novel Gradient Inversion attack based on Style Migration Network (GI-SMN), which breaks through the strong assumptions made by previous gradient inversion attacks. The optimization space is reduced by the refinement of the latent code and the use of regular terms to facilitate gradient matching. GI-SMN enables the reconstruction of user data with high similarity in batches. Experimental results have demonstrated that GI-SMN outperforms state-of-the-art gradient inversion attacks in both visual effect and similarity metrics. Additionally, it also can overcome gradient pruning and differential privacy defenses.

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