A consolidated and accessible security proof for finite-size decoy-state quantum key distribution

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.16578v1
• Date: Sun, 26 May 2024 14:13:33 GMT
• Title: A consolidated and accessible security proof for finite-size decoy-state quantum key distribution
• Authors: Jerome Wiesemann, Jan Krause, Davide Rusca, Nino Walenta,
• Abstract summary: We present an accessible and comprehensive security proof for the finite-size 1-decoy (and 2-decoy) BB84 protocol. This work can serve as a foundation for the discussion of QKD security and for the identification of potential vulnerabilities and device imperfections.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: In recent years, quantum key distribution (QKD) has evolved from a scientific research field to a commercially viable security solution, supported by mathematically formulated security proofs. However, since the knowledge required for a full understanding of a security proof is scattered across numerous publications, it has proven difficult to gain a comprehensive understanding of each step involved in the process and their limitations without considerable effort and attention to detail. Our paper aims to address this issue by presenting an accessible and comprehensive security proof for the finite-size 1-decoy (and 2-decoy) BB84 protocol in Renner's entropic uncertainty relation framework. We extensively consolidate and unify concepts from many works, thoroughly discussing the underlying assumptions and resolving technical inconsistencies. This work can serve as a foundation for the discussion of QKD security and for the identification of potential vulnerabilities and device imperfections. Our step-by-step approach and consistent notation assumes no prior exposure to security proofs, making it a robust and comprehensible reference, while maintaining theoretical rigor. Therefore, our contribution represents a significant advancement towards a broader understanding of QKD security proofs.

Related papers

• Strands Rocq: Why is a Security Protocol Correct, Mechanically? [3.6840775431698893]
  StrandsRocq is a mechanization of the strand spaces in Coq. It incorporates new original proof techniques and a novel notion of maximal penetrator. It provides a compositional proof of security for two simple authentication protocols.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2025-02-18T13:34:58Z)
• BiCert: A Bilinear Mixed Integer Programming Formulation for Precise Certified Bounds Against Data Poisoning Attacks [62.897993591443594]
  Data poisoning attacks pose one of the biggest threats to modern AI systems. Data poisoning attacks pose one of the biggest threats to modern AI systems. Data poisoning attacks pose one of the biggest threats to modern AI systems.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-12-13T14:56:39Z)
• Discrete-modulated continuous-variable quantum key distribution secure against general attacks [0.0]
  This work presents a security analysis of DM-CV-QKD against general sequential attacks, including finite-size effects. Remarkably, our proof considers attacks that are neither independent nor identical, and makes no assumptions about the Hilbert space dimension of the receiver.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-09-04T11:50:18Z)
• A Survey and Comparative Analysis of Security Properties of CAN Authentication Protocols [92.81385447582882]
  The Controller Area Network (CAN) bus leaves in-vehicle communications inherently non-secure. This paper reviews and compares the 15 most prominent authentication protocols for the CAN bus. We evaluate protocols based on essential operational criteria that contribute to ease of implementation.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-01-19T14:52:04Z)
• Practical quantum secure direct communication with squeezed states [55.41644538483948]
  We report the first table-top experimental demonstration of a CV-QSDC system and assess its security. This realization paves the way into future threat-less quantum metropolitan networks, compatible with coexisting advanced wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) systems.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-06-25T19:23:42Z)
• Security of differential phase shift QKD from relativistic principles [1.0515831025408138]
  This work presents the first full security proof of DPS QKD against general attacks. The proof combines techniques from quantum information theory, quantum optics, and relativity. Our results shed light on the range of applicability of state-of-the-art security proof techniques.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-01-26T19:00:00Z)
• Finite-Size Security for Discrete-Modulated Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Protocols [4.58733012283457]
  We present a composable finite-size security proof against independently and identically distributed collective attacks for a general DM CV-QKD protocol. We extend and apply a numerical security proof technique to calculate tight lower bounds on the secure key rate. Results show that our security proof method yields secure finitesize key rates under experimentally viable conditions up to at least 72km transmission distance.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-01-20T17:16:21Z)
• Is Vertical Logistic Regression Privacy-Preserving? A Comprehensive Privacy Analysis and Beyond [57.10914865054868]
  We consider vertical logistic regression (VLR) trained with mini-batch descent gradient. We provide a comprehensive and rigorous privacy analysis of VLR in a class of open-source Federated Learning frameworks.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2022-07-19T05:47:30Z)
• Quantum Proofs of Deletion for Learning with Errors [91.3755431537592]
  We construct the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme with certified deletion. Our main technical ingredient is an interactive protocol by which a quantum prover can convince a classical verifier that a sample from the Learning with Errors distribution in the form of a quantum state was deleted.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2022-03-03T10:07:32Z)
• Geometry of Banach spaces: a new route towards Position Based Cryptography [65.51757376525798]
  We study Position Based Quantum Cryptography (PBQC) from the perspective of geometric functional analysis and its connections with quantum games. The main question we are interested in asks for the optimal amount of entanglement that a coalition of attackers have to share in order to compromise the security of any PBQC protocol. We show that the understanding of the type properties of some more involved Banach spaces would allow to drop out the assumptions and lead to unconditional lower bounds on the resources used to attack our protocol.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2021-03-30T13:55:11Z)
• Quantum key distribution with correlated sources [1.7499351967216341]
  In theory, quantum key distribution (QKD) offers information-theoretic security. In practice, however, it does not due to discrepancies between the assumptions used in the security proofs and the behaviour of the real apparatuses. Here, we close this gap by introducing a simple yet general method to prove the security of QKD with arbitrarily long-range pulse correlations.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2019-08-22T09:05:17Z)

This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.

This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.