Blockchain Governance: An Empirical Analysis of User Engagement on DAOs
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.10945v1
- Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2024 17:43:02 GMT
- Title: Blockchain Governance: An Empirical Analysis of User Engagement on DAOs
- Authors: Brett Falk, Tasneem Pathan, Andrew Rigas, Gerry Tsoukalas,
- Abstract summary: We examine voting on four major blockchains: Aave, Compound, Lido and Uniswap.
We find that in most votes, the "minimal quorum," i.e., the smallest number of active voters who could swing the vote is quite small.
- Score: 0.0
- License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
- Abstract: In this note, we examine voting on four major blockchain DAOs: Aave, Compound, Lido and Uniswap. Using data directly collected from the Ethereum blockchain, we examine voter activity. We find that in most votes, the "minimal quorum," i.e., the smallest number of active voters who could swing the vote is quite small. To understand who is actually driving these DAOs, we use data from the Ethereum Name Service (ENS), Sybil.org, and Compound, to divide voters into different categories.
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