Breaking Agents: Compromising Autonomous LLM Agents Through Malfunction Amplification

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.20859v1
• Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 14:35:31 GMT
• Title: Breaking Agents: Compromising Autonomous LLM Agents Through Malfunction Amplification
• Authors: Boyang Zhang, Yicong Tan, Yun Shen, Ahmed Salem, Michael Backes, Savvas Zannettou, Yang Zhang,
• Abstract summary: Large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80% in multiple scenarios.
• Score: 35.16099878559559
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Recently, autonomous agents built on large language models (LLMs) have experienced significant development and are being deployed in real-world applications. These agents can extend the base LLM's capabilities in multiple ways. For example, a well-built agent using GPT-3.5-Turbo as its core can outperform the more advanced GPT-4 model by leveraging external components. More importantly, the usage of tools enables these systems to perform actions in the real world, moving from merely generating text to actively interacting with their environment. Given the agents' practical applications and their ability to execute consequential actions, it is crucial to assess potential vulnerabilities. Such autonomous systems can cause more severe damage than a standalone language model if compromised. While some existing research has explored harmful actions by LLM agents, our study approaches the vulnerability from a different perspective. We introduce a new type of attack that causes malfunctions by misleading the agent into executing repetitive or irrelevant actions. We conduct comprehensive evaluations using various attack methods, surfaces, and properties to pinpoint areas of susceptibility. Our experiments reveal that these attacks can induce failure rates exceeding 80\% in multiple scenarios. Through attacks on implemented and deployable agents in multi-agent scenarios, we accentuate the realistic risks associated with these vulnerabilities. To mitigate such attacks, we propose self-examination detection methods. However, our findings indicate these attacks are difficult to detect effectively using LLMs alone, highlighting the substantial risks associated with this vulnerability.

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