Remote Staking with Optimal Economic Safety

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.01896v3
• Date: Wed, 04 Dec 2024 00:57:45 GMT
• Title: Remote Staking with Optimal Economic Safety
• Authors: Xinshu Dong, Orfeas Stefanos Thyfronitis Litos, Ertem Nusret Tas, David Tse, Robin Linus Woll, Lei Yang, Mingchao Yu,
• Abstract summary: We present the first known remote staking protocols with guaranteed optimal economic safety. A major use case of this work is when the provider chain is Bitcoin, making available an asset worth more than 1.7 trillion USD to secure PoS chains.
• Score: 9.685926828113631
• License:
• Abstract: Proof-of-stake (PoS) blockchains require validators to lock their tokens as collateral, slashing these tokens if they are identified as protocol violators. PoS chains have mostly been secured by their native tokens. However, using only the native token upper-bounds the value eligible for staking by the market capitalization of the native token. In contrast, the remote staking of another crypto asset from a provider chain provides an avenue to improve the consumer chain's economic security. In this paper, we present the first known remote staking protocols with guaranteed optimal economic safety: whenever there is a safety violation on the consumer chain, at least one third of the provider's stake securing the consumer chain is slashed. To achieve this goal for a broad range of provider and consumer chains, two independent contributions are made: 1) a cryptographic protocol to slash stake even without smart contracts on the provider chain; 2) a secure unbonding protocol that ensures slashing before the stake is unbonded on the provider chain if there is safety violation on the consumer chain. A major use case of this work is when the provider chain is Bitcoin, making available an asset worth more than 1.7 trillion USD to secure PoS chains. Such a Bitcoin staking protocol has been launched on the Mainnet in August 2024 and has accumulated 2.1 billion USD worth of stake thus far.

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