Mind The Gap: Can Air-Gaps Keep Your Private Data Secure?

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.04190v1
• Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2024 11:08:05 GMT
• Title: Mind The Gap: Can Air-Gaps Keep Your Private Data Secure?
• Authors: Mordechai Guri,
• Abstract summary: 'Air-gap' measures keep sensitive data in networks entirely isolated from the Internet. Air-gap networks are relevant today to governmental organizations, healthcare industries, finance sectors, intellectual property and legal firms. Motivated and capable adversaries can use sophisticated attack vectors to penetrate the air-gapped networks, leaking sensitive data outward.
• Score: 1.74048653626208
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Personal data has become one of the most valuable assets and lucrative targets for attackers in the modern digital world. This includes personal identification information (PII), medical records, legal information, biometric data, and private communications. To protect it from hackers, 'air-gap' measures might be employed. This protective strategy keeps sensitive data in networks entirely isolated (physically and logically) from the Internet. Creating a physical 'air gap' between internal networks and the outside world safeguards sensitive data from theft and online threats. Air-gap networks are relevant today to governmental organizations, healthcare industries, finance sectors, intellectual property and legal firms, and others. In this paper, we dive deep into air-gap security in light of modern cyberattacks and data privacy. Despite this level of protection, publicized incidents from the last decade show that even air-gap networks are not immune to breaches. Motivated and capable adversaries can use sophisticated attack vectors to penetrate the air-gapped networks, leaking sensitive data outward. We focus on different aspects of air gap security. First, we overview cyber incidents that target air-gap networks, including infamous ones such Agent.btz. Second, we introduce the adversarial attack model and different attack vectors attackers may use to compromise air-gap networks. Third, we present the techniques attackers can apply to leak data out of air-gap networks and introduce more innovative ones based on our recent research. Finally, we propose the necessary countermeasures to protect the data, both defensive and preventive.

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