National Treasure: The Call for e-Democracy and US Election Security

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.08952v1
• Date: Fri, 13 Sep 2024 16:14:44 GMT
• Title: National Treasure: The Call for e-Democracy and US Election Security
• Authors: Adam Dorian Wong,
• Abstract summary: In the technology age, this can be solved with a Smartcard National ID backed by Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI) This could be a method to restore hope in democracy and move the country back towards elections under a Popular Vote.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Faith in the US electoral system is at risk. This issue stems from trust or lack thereof. Poor leaders ranted and attempted to sew discord in the democratic process and even tried to influence election results. Historically, the US has relied on paper ballots to cast private votes. Votes are watered down by the Electoral College. Elections are contested due to voter IDs and proof of citizenship. Methods of voting are nonsensically complex. In the technology age, this can be solved with a Smartcard National ID backed by Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI). This could be a method to restore hope in democracy and move the country back towards elections under a Popular Vote. Numbers are empirical and immutable and can solve the issue of Election Security in a bipartisan way. NATO allies like Estonia have already broken ground in using technology for eDemocracy or (Internet-based) iVoting. Acknowledging cyber attacks will happen, this is an opportunity for DHS and DOD (CYBERCOM) to collaborate on domestic operations and protect critical election infrastructure. This idea will not fix malicious information operations or civil stupidity. However, this is the way forward to securing elections now and forever. The views expressed by this whitepaper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of Dakota State University, the N.H. Army National Guard, the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Cleared for release by DOPSR on 13 SEP 2024.

Related papers

• Idiosyncratic properties of Australian STV election counting [52.669205232251585]
  Single Transferable Vote (STV) counting is used in several jurisdictions in Australia. This paper shows some of the unintuitive properties of some of these systems.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-09-18T01:19:27Z)
• Deceptive uses of Artificial Intelligence in elections strengthen support for AI ban [44.99833362998488]
  We propose a framework for assessing AI's impact on elections. We group AI-enabled campaigning uses into three categories -- campaign operations, voter outreach, and deception. We provide the first systematic evidence from a preregistered representative survey.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-08-08T12:58:20Z)
• Representation Bias in Political Sample Simulations with Large Language Models [54.48283690603358]
  This study seeks to identify and quantify biases in simulating political samples with Large Language Models. Using the GPT-3.5-Turbo model, we leverage data from the American National Election Studies, German Longitudinal Election Study, Zuobiao dataset, and China Family Panel Studies.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-07-16T05:52:26Z)
• Elections in the Post-Quantum Era: Is the Complexity Shield Strong Enough? [0.0]
  We consider quantum computers to be a new threat to the complexity shield described above. We provide an overview of possible attacks on election, discuss the abilities of quantum computing, and chart possible directions for future research in this area.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-03-08T12:52:11Z)
• Publicly auditable privacy-preserving electoral rolls [0.32498796510544625]
  We study the problem of designing publicly auditable yet privacy-preserving electoral rolls. The audit can detect polling-day ballot stuffing and denials to eligible voters by malicious polling officers. The entire electoral roll is never revealed, which prevents any large-scale systematic voter targeting and manipulation.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-02-18T13:11:48Z)
• Learning to Manipulate under Limited Information [44.99833362998488]
  We trained over 70,000 neural networks of 26 sizes to manipulate against 8 different voting methods. We find that some voting methods, such as Borda, are highly manipulable by networks with limited information, while others, such as Instant Runoff, are not.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-01-29T18:49:50Z)
• The Still Secret Ballot: The Limited Privacy Cost of Transparent Election Results [0.0]
  We show how an analyst unravels the secret ballot by uniquely linking votes on an anonymous ballot to the voter's name and address in the public voter file. We conclude the ballot can be both public and still as secret as it is under typical reporting practices.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-08-08T07:27:41Z)
• Adaptively Weighted Audits of Instant-Runoff Voting Elections: AWAIRE [61.872917066847855]
  Methods for auditing instant-runoff voting (IRV) elections are either not risk-limiting or require cast vote records (CVRs), the voting system's electronic record of the votes on each ballot. We develop an RLA method that uses adaptively weighted averages of test supermartingales to efficiently audit IRV elections when CVRs are not available.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-07-20T15:55:34Z)
• Towards Secure Virtual Elections: Multiparty Computation of Order Based Voting Rules [5.156484100374059]
  One of the main challenges in e-voting systems is to certify that the computed results are consistent with the cast ballots. We propose a secure voting protocol for elections governed by order-based voting rules. Our protocol offers perfect ballot secrecy, in the sense that it issues only the required output, while no other information on the cast ballots is revealed.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2022-05-21T12:17:21Z)
• Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules [105.35249497503527]
  The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that no unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule is strategyproof. We revisit voting rules and consider a weaker notion of strategyproofness called not obvious manipulability.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2021-11-03T02:41:48Z)
• Security Survey and Analysis of Vote-by-Mail Systems [0.0]
  We examine the security of electronic systems used in the process of voting by mail, including online voter registration and online ballot tracking systems. We find that online voter registration systems in some states have vulnerabilities that allow adversaries to alter or effectively prevent a voter's registration. We additionally find that ballot tracking systems raise serious privacy questions surrounding ease of access to voter data.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2020-05-18T02:18:15Z)

This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.

This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.