Online Combinatorial Allocations and Auctions with Few Samples

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.11091v1
• Date: Tue, 17 Sep 2024 11:43:55 GMT
• Title: Online Combinatorial Allocations and Auctions with Few Samples
• Authors: Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Sahil Singla,
• Abstract summary: This paper investigates the feasibility of achieving O(1)-competitive algorithms under the realistic constraint of having access to only a limited number of samples from the underlying bidder distributions. Our first main contribution shows that a mere single sample from each bidder distribution is sufficient to yield an O(1)-competitive algorithm for submodular/XOS valuations.
• Score: 9.675397292814122
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The aim is to immediately allocate a subset of the remaining items to maximize the total welfare, defined as the sum of bidder valuations. A long line of work has studied this problem when the bidder valuations come from known independent distributions. In particular, for submodular/XOS valuations, we know 2-competitive algorithms/mechanisms that set a fixed price for each item and the arriving bidders take their favorite subset of the remaining items given these prices. However, these algorithms traditionally presume the availability of the underlying distributions as part of the input to the algorithm. Contrary to this assumption, practical scenarios often require the learning of distributions, a task complicated by limited sample availability. This paper investigates the feasibility of achieving O(1)-competitive algorithms under the realistic constraint of having access to only a limited number of samples from the underlying bidder distributions. Our first main contribution shows that a mere single sample from each bidder distribution is sufficient to yield an O(1)-competitive algorithm for submodular/XOS valuations. This result leverages a novel extension of the secretary-style analysis, employing the sample to have the algorithm compete against itself. Although online, this first approach does not provide an online truthful mechanism. Our second main contribution shows that a polynomial number of samples suffices to yield a $(2+\epsilon)$-competitive online truthful mechanism for submodular/XOS valuations and any constant $\epsilon>0$. This result is based on a generalization of the median-based algorithm for the single-item prophet inequality problem to combinatorial settings with multiple items.

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