Safety case template for frontier AI: A cyber inability argument

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.08088v1
• Date: Tue, 12 Nov 2024 18:45:08 GMT
• Title: Safety case template for frontier AI: A cyber inability argument
• Authors: Arthur Goemans, Marie Davidsen Buhl, Jonas Schuett, Tomek Korbak, Jessica Wang, Benjamin Hilton, Geoffrey Irving,
• Abstract summary: We propose a safety case template for offensive cyber capabilities. We identify a number of risk models, derive proxy tasks from the risk models, define evaluation settings for the proxy tasks, and connect those with evaluation results.
• Score: 2.2628353000034065
• License:
• Abstract: Frontier artificial intelligence (AI) systems pose increasing risks to society, making it essential for developers to provide assurances about their safety. One approach to offering such assurances is through a safety case: a structured, evidence-based argument aimed at demonstrating why the risk associated with a safety-critical system is acceptable. In this article, we propose a safety case template for offensive cyber capabilities. We illustrate how developers could argue that a model does not have capabilities posing unacceptable cyber risks by breaking down the main claim into progressively specific sub-claims, each supported by evidence. In our template, we identify a number of risk models, derive proxy tasks from the risk models, define evaluation settings for the proxy tasks, and connect those with evaluation results. Elements of current frontier safety techniques - such as risk models, proxy tasks, and capability evaluations - use implicit arguments for overall system safety. This safety case template integrates these elements using the Claims Arguments Evidence (CAE) framework in order to make safety arguments coherent and explicit. While uncertainties around the specifics remain, this template serves as a proof of concept, aiming to foster discussion on AI safety cases and advance AI assurance.

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