Perceptual Hash Inversion Attacks on Image-Based Sexual Abuse Removal Tools

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2412.06056v1
• Date: Sun, 08 Dec 2024 20:23:16 GMT
• Title: Perceptual Hash Inversion Attacks on Image-Based Sexual Abuse Removal Tools
• Authors: Sophie Hawkes, Christian Weinert, Teresa Almeida, Maryam Mehrnezhad,
• Abstract summary: We show that perceptual hashing, crucial for detecting and removing image-based sexual abuse online, faces vulnerabilities from low-budget inversion attacks based on generative AI. We advocate to implement secure hash matching in IBSA removal tools to mitigate potentially fatal consequences.
• Score: 6.485652681645558
• License:
• Abstract: We show that perceptual hashing, crucial for detecting and removing image-based sexual abuse (IBSA) online, faces vulnerabilities from low-budget inversion attacks based on generative AI. This jeopardizes the privacy of users, especially vulnerable groups. We advocate to implement secure hash matching in IBSA removal tools to mitigate potentially fatal consequences.

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