Poisoned Forgery Face: Towards Backdoor Attacks on Face Forgery Detection

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11473v1
• Date: Sun, 18 Feb 2024 06:31:05 GMT
• Title: Poisoned Forgery Face: Towards Backdoor Attacks on Face Forgery Detection
• Authors: Jiawei Liang, Siyuan Liang, Aishan Liu, Xiaojun Jia, Junhao Kuang, Xiaochun Cao
• Abstract summary: This paper introduces a novel and previously unrecognized threat in face forgery detection scenarios caused by backdoor attack. By embedding backdoors into models, attackers can deceive detectors into producing erroneous predictions for forged faces. We propose emphPoisoned Forgery Face framework, which enables clean-label backdoor attacks on face forgery detectors.
• Score: 62.595450266262645
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: The proliferation of face forgery techniques has raised significant concerns within society, thereby motivating the development of face forgery detection methods. These methods aim to distinguish forged faces from genuine ones and have proven effective in practical applications. However, this paper introduces a novel and previously unrecognized threat in face forgery detection scenarios caused by backdoor attack. By embedding backdoors into models and incorporating specific trigger patterns into the input, attackers can deceive detectors into producing erroneous predictions for forged faces. To achieve this goal, this paper proposes \emph{Poisoned Forgery Face} framework, which enables clean-label backdoor attacks on face forgery detectors. Our approach involves constructing a scalable trigger generator and utilizing a novel convolving process to generate translation-sensitive trigger patterns. Moreover, we employ a relative embedding method based on landmark-based regions to enhance the stealthiness of the poisoned samples. Consequently, detectors trained on our poisoned samples are embedded with backdoors. Notably, our approach surpasses SoTA backdoor baselines with a significant improvement in attack success rate (+16.39\% BD-AUC) and reduction in visibility (-12.65\% $L_\infty$). Furthermore, our attack exhibits promising performance against backdoor defenses. We anticipate that this paper will draw greater attention to the potential threats posed by backdoor attacks in face forgery detection scenarios. Our codes will be made available at \url{https://github.com/JWLiang007/PFF}

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