Proactive Adversarial Defense: Harnessing Prompt Tuning in Vision-Language Models to Detect Unseen Backdoored Images

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2412.08755v2
• Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2025 19:15:20 GMT
• Title: Proactive Adversarial Defense: Harnessing Prompt Tuning in Vision-Language Models to Detect Unseen Backdoored Images
• Authors: Kyle Stein, Andrew Arash Mahyari, Guillermo Francia, Eman El-Sheikh,
• Abstract summary: Backdoor attacks pose a critical threat by embedding hidden triggers into inputs, causing models to misclassify them into target labels. We introduce a groundbreaking method to detect unseen backdoored images during both training and inference. Our approach trains learnable text prompts to differentiate clean images from those with hidden backdoor triggers.
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• Abstract: Backdoor attacks pose a critical threat by embedding hidden triggers into inputs, causing models to misclassify them into target labels. While extensive research has focused on mitigating these attacks in object recognition models through weight fine-tuning, much less attention has been given to detecting backdoored samples directly. Given the vast datasets used in training, manual inspection for backdoor triggers is impractical, and even state-of-the-art defense mechanisms fail to fully neutralize their impact. To address this gap, we introduce a groundbreaking method to detect unseen backdoored images during both training and inference. Leveraging the transformative success of prompt tuning in Vision Language Models (VLMs), our approach trains learnable text prompts to differentiate clean images from those with hidden backdoor triggers. Experiments demonstrate the exceptional efficacy of this method, achieving an impressive average accuracy of 86% across two renowned datasets for detecting unseen backdoor triggers, establishing a new standard in backdoor defense.

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