Quantifying the Upper Limit of Backflash Attack in Quantum Key Distribution

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2501.09984v2
• Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 00:01:31 GMT
• Title: Quantifying the Upper Limit of Backflash Attack in Quantum Key Distribution
• Authors: Jialei Su, Junxuan Liu, Zihao Chen, Mingyang Zhong, Qingquan Peng, Jiangfang Ding, Yijun Wang, Anqi Huang, Ying Guo,
• Abstract summary: We study experimentally and theoretically the upper limit of a backflash attack, as one of the vital passive attacks, on a fiber-based QKD system.<n>We have developed a simulation model to analyze the maximum distinguish ratio of decoding can be achieved.<n> Consequently, the secure key rate of the decoy-state BB84 QKD system under backflash attack is calculated.
• Score: 8.70837658845072
• License: http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/
• Abstract: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) theoretically provides information-theoretic security based on physical laws. However, imperfections in practice lead to the possibility of quantum hacking on the QKD implementation, especially the passive attacks that are difficult to be detected. In this paper, we study experimentally and theoretically the upper limit of a backflash attack, as one of the vital passive attacks, on a fiber-based QKD system. We experimentally demonstrate the backflash attack on a full equipped fiber-based QKD receiver to show its feasibility and limited distinguish ratio of decoding. More importantly, we have developed a simulation model to analyze the maximum distinguish ratio of decoding can be achieved considering the wide-spectrum feature of backflash photons, which indicates that Eve can extract effective key information from 95.7% of the backflash photons. Consequently, the secure key rate of the decoy-state BB84 QKD system under backflash attack is calculated. This work provides a general methodology to comprehensively evaluate the effect of the backflash attack on a QKD system.

Related papers

• Fooling the Decoder: An Adversarial Attack on Quantum Error Correction [49.48516314472825]
  In this work, we target a basic RL surface code decoder (DeepQ) to create the first adversarial attack on quantum error correction. We demonstrate an attack that reduces the logical qubit lifetime in memory experiments by up to five orders of magnitude. This attack highlights the susceptibility of machine learning-based QEC and underscores the importance of further research into robust QEC methods.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2025-04-28T10:10:05Z)
• Backflash Attack on Coherent One-Way Quantum Key Distribution [1.6643133674534685]
  We experimentally demonstrate an eavesdropper's (Eve's) information gain by exploiting the breakdown flash generated by the single photon avalanche detector (SPAD) This work quantifies Eve's learning with a QKD system that includes a key distillation engine (KDE)
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2025-02-06T13:44:58Z)
• Overcoming Intensity Limits for Long-Distance Quantum Key Distribution [0.0]
  Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) enables the sharing of cryptographic keys secured by quantum mechanics. BB84 protocol assumed single-photon sources, but practical systems rely on weak coherent pulses vulnerable to photon-number-splitting (PNS) attacks. We develop a new approach to security in QKD by shifting from worst-case assumption analysis to observation-dependent inference.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-12-28T20:40:23Z)
• Practical hybrid PQC-QKD protocols with enhanced security and performance [44.8840598334124]
  We develop hybrid protocols by which QKD and PQC inter-operate within a joint quantum-classical network. In particular, we consider different hybrid designs that may offer enhanced speed and/or security over the individual performance of either approach.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-11-02T00:02:01Z)
• Practical security of twin-field quantum key distribution with optical phase-locked loop under wavelength-switching attack [8.199460413072904]
  We demonstrate a wavelength-switching attack on a TF-class QKD system.<n>The maximum observed increase in mean photon number is 8.7%, which has been theoretically proven to compromise the security of a TF-class QKD system.<n>We highlight the importance of system calibration in the practical security in TF-class QKD implementation.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-08-18T00:38:13Z)
• Empirical Risk-aware Machine Learning on Trojan-Horse Detection for Trusted Quantum Key Distribution Networks [31.857236131842843]
  Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic technique that offers high levels of data security during transmission. The existence of a gap between theoretical concepts and practical implementation has raised concerns about the trustworthiness of QKD networks. We propose the implementation of risk-aware machine learning techniques that present risk analysis for Trojan-horse attacks over the time-variant quantum channel.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2024-01-26T03:36:13Z)
• Mitigating the source-side channel vulnerability by characterization of photon statistics [1.3458279593461016]
  Quantum key distribution (QKD) theoretically offers unconditional security. Unfortunately, the gap between theory and practice threatens side-channel attacks on practical QKD systems. We aim to bridge the gap between theory and practice to achieve information-theoretic security.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-08-28T08:37:59Z)
• Quantum Key Distribution Using a Quantum Emitter in Hexagonal Boron Nitride [48.97025221755422]
  We demonstrate a room temperature, discrete-variable quantum key distribution system using a bright single photon source in hexagonal-boron nitride. We have generated keys with one million bits length, and demonstrated a secret key of approximately 70,000 bits, at a quantum bit error rate of 6%. Our work demonstrates the first proof of concept finite-key BB84 QKD system realised with hBN defects.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2023-02-13T09:38:51Z)
• Efficient room-temperature molecular single-photon sources for quantum key distribution [51.56795970800138]
  Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) allows the distribution of cryptographic keys between multiple users in an information-theoretic secure way. We introduce and demonstrate a proof-of-concept QKD system exploiting a molecule-based single-photon source operating at room temperature and emitting at 785nm.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2022-02-25T11:52:10Z)
• Backflash Light as a Security Vulnerability in Quantum Key Distribution Systems [77.34726150561087]
  We review the security vulnerabilities of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems. We mainly focus on a particular effect known as backflash light, which can be a source of eavesdropping attacks.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2020-03-23T18:23:12Z)
• Hacking single-photon avalanche detector in quantum key distribution via pulse illumination [6.285329211368446]
  We show an adversary's capability of exploiting the imperfection of the patch itself to bypass the patch. We also analyze the secret key rate under the pulse illumination attack, which theoretically confirmed that Eve can conduct the attack to learn the secret key.
  arXiv  Detail & Related papers  (2020-02-21T06:05:18Z)

This list is automatically generated from the titles and abstracts of the papers in this site.

This site does not guarantee the quality of this site (including all information) and is not responsible for any consequences.