The TIP of the Iceberg: Revealing a Hidden Class of Task-in-Prompt Adversarial Attacks on LLMs
- URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2501.18626v3
- Date: Tue, 04 Feb 2025 17:09:13 GMT
- Title: The TIP of the Iceberg: Revealing a Hidden Class of Task-in-Prompt Adversarial Attacks on LLMs
- Authors: Sergey Berezin, Reza Farahbakhsh, Noel Crespi,
- Abstract summary: We present a novel class of jailbreak adversarial attacks on LLMs.
Our approach embeds sequence-to-sequence tasks into the model's prompt to indirectly generate prohibited inputs.
We demonstrate that our techniques successfully circumvent safeguards in six state-of-the-art language models.
- Score: 1.9424018922013224
- License:
- Abstract: We present a novel class of jailbreak adversarial attacks on LLMs, termed Task-in-Prompt (TIP) attacks. Our approach embeds sequence-to-sequence tasks (e.g., cipher decoding, riddles, code execution) into the model's prompt to indirectly generate prohibited inputs. To systematically assess the effectiveness of these attacks, we introduce the PHRYGE benchmark. We demonstrate that our techniques successfully circumvent safeguards in six state-of-the-art language models, including GPT-4o and LLaMA 3.2. Our findings highlight critical weaknesses in current LLM safety alignments and underscore the urgent need for more sophisticated defence strategies. Warning: this paper contains examples of unethical inquiries used solely for research purposes.
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