Tell Me Why: Incentivizing Explanations

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2502.13410v1
• Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2025 03:47:34 GMT
• Title: Tell Me Why: Incentivizing Explanations
• Authors: Siddarth Srinivasan, Ezra Karger, Michiel Bakker, Yiling Chen,
• Abstract summary: There is no known mechanism that provides incentives to elicit explanations for beliefs from agents. Standard Bayesian models make assumptions that preempt the need for explanations. This work argues that rationales-explanations of an agent's private information-lead to more efficient aggregation.
• Score: 3.2754470919268543
• License:
• Abstract: Common sense suggests that when individuals explain why they believe something, we can arrive at more accurate conclusions than when they simply state what they believe. Yet, there is no known mechanism that provides incentives to elicit explanations for beliefs from agents. This likely stems from the fact that standard Bayesian models make assumptions (like conditional independence of signals) that preempt the need for explanations, in order to show efficient information aggregation. A natural justification for the value of explanations is that agents' beliefs tend to be drawn from overlapping sources of information, so agents' belief reports do not reveal all that needs to be known. Indeed, this work argues that rationales-explanations of an agent's private information-lead to more efficient aggregation by allowing agents to efficiently identify what information they share and what information is new. Building on this model of rationales, we present a novel 'deliberation mechanism' to elicit rationales from agents in which truthful reporting of beliefs and rationales is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.

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