Online Bidding under RoS Constraints without Knowing the Value

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2503.03195v1
• Date: Wed, 05 Mar 2025 05:25:54 GMT
• Title: Online Bidding under RoS Constraints without Knowing the Value
• Authors: Sushant Vijayan, Zhe Feng, Swati Padmanabhan, Karthikeyan Shanmugam, Arun Suggala, Di Wang,
• Abstract summary: We consider the problem of bidding in online advertising, where an advertiser aims to maximize value while adhering to budget and Return-on-Spend constraints.<n>We propose a novel Upper Confidence Bound (UCB)-style algorithm that carefully manages this trade-off.
• Score: 22.193658401789033
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: We consider the problem of bidding in online advertising, where an advertiser aims to maximize value while adhering to budget and Return-on-Spend (RoS) constraints. Unlike prior work that assumes knowledge of the value generated by winning each impression ({e.g.,} conversions), we address the more realistic setting where the advertiser must simultaneously learn the optimal bidding strategy and the value of each impression opportunity. This introduces a challenging exploration-exploitation dilemma: the advertiser must balance exploring different bids to estimate impression values with exploiting current knowledge to bid effectively. To address this, we propose a novel Upper Confidence Bound (UCB)-style algorithm that carefully manages this trade-off. Via a rigorous theoretical analysis, we prove that our algorithm achieves $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T\log(|\mathcal{B}|T)})$ regret and constraint violation, where $T$ is the number of bidding rounds and $\mathcal{B}$ is the domain of possible bids. This establishes the first optimal regret and constraint violation bounds for bidding in the online setting with unknown impression values. Moreover, our algorithm is computationally efficient and simple to implement. We validate our theoretical findings through experiments on synthetic data, demonstrating that our algorithm exhibits strong empirical performance compared to existing approaches.

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