Jailbreaking is (Mostly) Simpler Than You Think

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2503.05264v1
• Date: Fri, 07 Mar 2025 09:28:19 GMT
• Title: Jailbreaking is (Mostly) Simpler Than You Think
• Authors: Mark Russinovich, Ahmed Salem,
• Abstract summary: We introduce the Context Compliance Attack (CCA), a novel, optimization-free method for bypassing AI safety mechanisms.<n>CCA exploits a fundamental architectural vulnerability inherent in many deployed AI systems.
• Score: 2.7174461714624805
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: We introduce the Context Compliance Attack (CCA), a novel, optimization-free method for bypassing AI safety mechanisms. Unlike current approaches -- which rely on complex prompt engineering and computationally intensive optimization -- CCA exploits a fundamental architectural vulnerability inherent in many deployed AI systems. By subtly manipulating conversation history, CCA convinces the model to comply with a fabricated dialogue context, thereby triggering restricted behavior. Our evaluation across a diverse set of open-source and proprietary models demonstrates that this simple attack can circumvent state-of-the-art safety protocols. We discuss the implications of these findings and propose practical mitigation strategies to fortify AI systems against such elementary yet effective adversarial tactics.

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