NaviDet: Efficient Input-level Backdoor Detection on Text-to-Image Synthesis via Neuron Activation Variation

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2503.06453v1
• Date: Sun, 09 Mar 2025 05:27:44 GMT
• Title: NaviDet: Efficient Input-level Backdoor Detection on Text-to-Image Synthesis via Neuron Activation Variation
• Authors: Shengfang Zhai, Jiajun Li, Yue Liu, Huanran Chen, Zhihua Tian, Wenjie Qu, Qingni Shen, Ruoxi Jia, Yinpeng Dong, Jiaheng Zhang,
• Abstract summary: NaviDet is the first general input-level backdoor detection framework for identifying backdoor inputs across various backdoor targets.<n>Our approach is based on the new observation that trigger tokens tend to induce significant neuron activation variation in the early stage of the diffusion generation process.
• Score: 37.075824084492524
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: In recent years, text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models have garnered significant attention for their ability to generate high-quality images reflecting text prompts. However, their growing popularity has also led to the emergence of backdoor threats, posing substantial risks. Currently, effective defense strategies against such threats are lacking due to the diversity of backdoor targets in T2I synthesis. In this paper, we propose NaviDet, the first general input-level backdoor detection framework for identifying backdoor inputs across various backdoor targets. Our approach is based on the new observation that trigger tokens tend to induce significant neuron activation variation in the early stage of the diffusion generation process, a phenomenon we term Early-step Activation Variation. Leveraging this insight, NaviDet detects malicious samples by analyzing neuron activation variations caused by input tokens. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our method against various T2I backdoor attacks, surpassing existing baselines with significantly lower computational overhead. Furthermore, we rigorously demonstrate that our method remains effective against potential adaptive attacks.

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