"i am a stochastic parrot, and so r u": Is AI-based framing of human behaviour and cognition a conceptual metaphor or conceptual engineering?

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2504.07756v1
• Date: Thu, 10 Apr 2025 13:55:32 GMT
• Title: "i am a stochastic parrot, and so r u": Is AI-based framing of human behaviour and cognition a conceptual metaphor or conceptual engineering?
• Authors: Warmhold Jan Thomas Mollema, Thomas Wachter,
• Abstract summary: We ask: can the conceptual constellation of the computational and AI be applied to the human domain?<n>We argue that it most importantly is a misleading 'double metaphor' because of the metaphorical connection between human computation and psychology.<n>The perspective of the conceptual metaphors shows avenues for forms of conceptual engineering.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• Abstract: Given the massive integration of AI technologies into our daily lives, AI-related concepts are being used to metaphorically compare AI systems with human behaviour and/or cognitive abilities like language acquisition. Rightfully, the epistemic success of these metaphorical comparisons should be debated. Against the backdrop of the conflicting positions of the 'computational' and 'meat' chauvinisms, we ask: can the conceptual constellation of the computational and AI be applied to the human domain and what does it mean to do so? What is one doing when the conceptual constellations of AI in particular are used in this fashion? Rooted in a Wittgensteinian view of concepts and language-use, we consider two possible answers and pit them against each other: either these examples are conceptual metaphors, or they are attempts at conceptual engineering. We argue that they are conceptual metaphors, but that (1) this position is unaware of its own epistemological contingency, and (2) it risks committing the ''map-territory fallacy''. Down at the conceptual foundations of computation, (3) it most importantly is a misleading 'double metaphor' because of the metaphorical connection between human psychology and computation. In response to the shortcomings of this projected conceptual organisation of AI onto the human domain, we argue that there is a semantic catch. The perspective of the conceptual metaphors shows avenues for forms of conceptual engineering. If this methodology's criteria are met, the fallacies and epistemic shortcomings related to the conceptual metaphor view can be bypassed. At its best, the cross-pollution of the human and AI conceptual domains is one that prompts us to reflect anew on how the boundaries of our current concepts serve us and how they could be approved.

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