A Cryptographic Perspective on Mitigation vs. Detection in Machine Learning

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2504.20310v1
• Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 23:46:45 GMT
• Title: A Cryptographic Perspective on Mitigation vs. Detection in Machine Learning
• Authors: Greg Gluch, Shafi Goldwasser,
• Abstract summary: We define defense by detection (DbD) and defense by mitigation (DbM)<n>We show that achieving DbD and achieving DbM are equivalent for ML classification tasks.<n>We show a separation between DbD and DbM by exhibiting a generative learning task for which is possible to defend by mitigation but is provably impossible to defend by detection.
• Score: 2.8437395946408124
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: In this paper, we initiate a cryptographically inspired theoretical study of detection versus mitigation of adversarial inputs produced by attackers of Machine Learning algorithms during inference time. We formally define defense by detection (DbD) and defense by mitigation (DbM). Our definitions come in the form of a 3-round protocol between two resource-bounded parties: a trainer/defender and an attacker. The attacker aims to produce inference-time inputs that fool the training algorithm. We define correctness, completeness, and soundness properties to capture successful defense at inference time while not degrading (too much) the performance of the algorithm on inputs from the training distribution. We first show that achieving DbD and achieving DbM are equivalent for ML classification tasks. Surprisingly, this is not the case for ML generative learning tasks, where there are many possible correct outputs that can be generated for each input. We show a separation between DbD and DbM by exhibiting a generative learning task for which is possible to defend by mitigation but is provably impossible to defend by detection under the assumption that the Identity-Based Fully Homomorphic Encryption (IB-FHE), publicly-verifiable zero-knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Arguments of Knowledge (zk-SNARK) and Strongly Unforgeable Signatures exist. The mitigation phase uses significantly fewer samples than the initial training algorithm.

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