Upgrading Democracies with Fairer Voting Methods

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2505.14349v1
• Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 13:31:43 GMT
• Title: Upgrading Democracies with Fairer Voting Methods
• Authors: Evangelos Pournaras, Srijoni Majumdar, Thomas Wellings, Joshua C. Yang, Fatemeh B. Heravan, Regula Hänggli Fricker, Dirk Helbing,
• Abstract summary: We show how one can upgrade real-world democracies by using alternative preferential voting methods.<n>By rigorously assessing a new participatory budgeting approach applied in the city of Aarau, Switzerland, we unravel the striking voting outcomes.<n>We also reveal strong underlying democratic values exhibited by citizens who support fair voting methods.
• Score: 0.6282171844772421
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
• Abstract: Voting methods are instrumental design element of democracies. Citizens use them to express and aggregate their preferences to reach a collective decision. However, voting outcomes can be as sensitive to voting rules as they are to people's voting choices. Despite the significance and inter-disciplinary scientific progress on voting methods, several democracies keep relying on outdated voting methods that do not fit modern, pluralistic societies well, while lacking social innovation. Here, we demonstrate how one can upgrade real-world democracies, namely by using alternative preferential voting methods such as cumulative voting and the method of equal shares designed for a proportional representation of voters' preferences. By rigorously assessing a new participatory budgeting approach applied in the city of Aarau, Switzerland, we unravel the striking voting outcomes of fair voting methods: more winning projects with the same budget and broader geographic and preference representation of citizens by the elected projects, in particular for voters who used to be under-represented, while promoting novel project ideas. We provide profound causal evidence showing that citizens prefer proportional voting methods, which possess strong legitimacy without the need of very technical specialized explanations. We also reveal strong underlying democratic values exhibited by citizens who support fair voting methods such as altruism and compromise. These findings come with a global momentum to unleash a new and long-awaited participation blueprint of how to upgrade democracies.

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