JavaSith: A Client-Side Framework for Analyzing Potentially Malicious Extensions in Browsers, VS Code, and NPM Packages

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2505.21263v1
• Date: Tue, 27 May 2025 14:40:25 GMT
• Title: JavaSith: A Client-Side Framework for Analyzing Potentially Malicious Extensions in Browsers, VS Code, and NPM Packages
• Authors: Avihay Cohen,
• Abstract summary: JavaSith is a novel framework for analyzing potentially malicious extensions in web browsers, Visual Studio Code (VSCode), and Node's NPM packages.<n>We present the design and architecture of JavaSith, including techniques for intercepting extension behavior over simulated time.<n>We demonstrate how JavaSith can catch stealthy malicious behaviors that evade traditional detection.
• Score: 0.0
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
• Abstract: Modern software supply chains face an increasing threat from malicious code hidden in trusted components such as browser extensions, IDE extensions, and open-source packages. This paper introduces JavaSith, a novel client-side framework for analyzing potentially malicious extensions in web browsers, Visual Studio Code (VSCode), and Node's NPM packages. JavaSith combines a runtime sandbox that emulates browser/Node.js extension APIs (with a ``time machine'' to accelerate time-based triggers) with static analysis and a local large language model (LLM) to assess risk from code and metadata. We present the design and architecture of JavaSith, including techniques for intercepting extension behavior over simulated time and extracting suspicious patterns. Through case studies on real-world attacks (such as a supply-chain compromise of a Chrome extension and malicious VSCode extensions installing cryptominers), we demonstrate how JavaSith can catch stealthy malicious behaviors that evade traditional detection. We evaluate the framework's effectiveness and discuss its limitations and future enhancements. JavaSith's client-side approach empowers end-users/organizations to vet extensions and packages before trustingly integrating them into their environments.

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