Coward: Toward Practical Proactive Federated Backdoor Defense via Collision-based Watermark

• URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/2508.02115v1
• Date: Mon, 04 Aug 2025 06:51:33 GMT
• Title: Coward: Toward Practical Proactive Federated Backdoor Defense via Collision-based Watermark
• Authors: Wenjie Li, Siying Gu, Yiming Li, Kangjie Chen, Zhili Chen, Tianwei Zhang, Shu-Tao Xia, Dacheng Tao,
• Abstract summary: We introduce a new proactive defense, dubbed Coward, inspired by our discovery of multi-backdoor collision effects.<n>In general, we detect attackers by evaluating whether the server-injected, conflicting global watermark is erased during local training rather than retained.
• Score: 90.94234374893287
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
• Abstract: Backdoor detection is currently the mainstream defense against backdoor attacks in federated learning (FL), where malicious clients upload poisoned updates that compromise the global model and undermine the reliability of FL deployments. Existing backdoor detection techniques fall into two categories, including passive and proactive ones, depending on whether the server proactively modifies the global model. However, both have inherent limitations in practice: passive defenses are vulnerable to common non-i.i.d. data distributions and random participation of FL clients, whereas current proactive defenses suffer inevitable out-of-distribution (OOD) bias because they rely on backdoor co-existence effects. To address these issues, we introduce a new proactive defense, dubbed Coward, inspired by our discovery of multi-backdoor collision effects, in which consecutively planted, distinct backdoors significantly suppress earlier ones. In general, we detect attackers by evaluating whether the server-injected, conflicting global watermark is erased during local training rather than retained. Our method preserves the advantages of proactive defenses in handling data heterogeneity (\ie, non-i.i.d. data) while mitigating the adverse impact of OOD bias through a revised detection mechanism. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets confirm the effectiveness of Coward and its resilience to potential adaptive attacks. The code for our method would be available at https://github.com/still2009/cowardFL.

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